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A cross-country regression using only a handful of deeply rooted 
explanatory variables accounts for 80 percent of the variation in 
living standards across countries. Most of the biggest residuals 
from the regression can also be explained, at least partially, 
with rudimentary facts about the associated countries. What 
remains may be a useful indicator of a country’s openness and 
innovative capacity throughout its economic history. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Neoclassical Growth Model implies that countries with similar 
technology and intangibles will converge to similar average living standards 
in the long term. Exactly which intangibles are important has been the 
subject of much research and debate. 
 
Some scholars, notably Jeffrey Sachs, have stressed immutable factors with 
direct economic consequences, such as climate and geography (see, for 
example, Mellinger et al. [1999]). Others, including Jared Diamond have 
suggested that geography has even farther-reaching effects on health and 
human capacity (as in Wolfe et al. [2007]). Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny 
introduced the human element, studying the importance of legal foundations 
laid by colonial powers (summarized in La Porta et al. [2008]). Finally, Daron 
Acemoglu and James Robinson added a slightly different set of manmade 
factors with their work on “inclusive” institutions [Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2012]. 
 
In my own work, I have cited several of these so-called “deep factors”, and a 
few others, as potential drivers of living standards in the long term [Altman, 
2011]. To the extent that these factors have been set in stone – sometimes 
literally – for centuries, the economic destinies of many countries may be 
predetermined. So it is of special interest when countries either overachieve 
or fall short of generating the living standards one might have expected. 
 
Here I examine how much of current differences in living standards can be 
explained by these deep factors established long ago. Then I try to explain the 
performance of countries that exceed or undershoot the targets determined by 
these factors. Finally, I ask whether the countries whose performance cannot 
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easily be explained by other exogenous forces are in fact the greatest 
exponents of human innovation. 
 
 
2. Methods 
 
I use ordinary least squares regression to measure the relationships between 
several deep factors and average living standards in a large sample of 
countries and territories. My measure of living standards is the log of gross 
domestic product per capita in purchasing power terms, according to the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. The data are for 2010 
or, in a few cases where figures are unavailable, for 2009. 
 
Because I am particularly interested in the share of output that does not 
come from a country’s natural endowment, I use additional data from the 
World Bank to discount the percentage of GDP that derives from resource 
rents. These include oil, gas, coal, forests, and minerals. 
 
My explanatory variables are based on geography, legal systems, and cultural 
norms. Some of these variables come from the Global Development Network 
Growth Database compiled by William Easterly at the World Bank in 2001. 
They include a composite measure of a country’s latitude (which I use to 
measure distance from the equator), a dummy variable for being landlocked, 
and a series of other dummy variables for having a legal system of British, 
French, German, Scandinavian, or state-socialist origin. 
 
To these I add each country’s average annual temperature and dummy 
variables for unusually low or high annual rainfall, all from the website 
Weatherbase by Canty and Associates. The final variable is the only cultural 
one: the Gender Inequality Index (GII) published by the United Nations 
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Development Program in 2011 using data from 2010. Higher values of the 
index denote less equality between the sexes in health, education, and labor 
force participation. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the regressions using first just the 
geographical variables, then adding the variables for legal systems and 
gender inequality. Table 2 shows the seven countries with the highest and 
lowest residuals from the regression, together representing 10 percent of the 
sample. I use the same sample in each regression to aid in the interpretation 
of the results; versions of the first two regressions with unconstrained 
samples (the GII is the limiting variable) are in the Appendix. 
 
In the first regression, half of variation in log standards of living is explained 
by just five variables describing geography and climate, two of which are 
based on rainfall. This improves to about 55 percent of variation with the 
addition of the dummy variables for legal system, with state-socialist as the 
omitted category. Including the GII makes a much bigger difference, 
increasing the explanatory power of the third regression to a startling 80 
percent, still with just 10 explanatory variables, four of which are dummies 
for legal foundations. The inclusion of the GII also reduces the coefficients for 
being landlocked and for distance from the equator. 
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Table 1: Regression of log per capita gross domestic product at purchasing 
power parity (boldface signifies coefficient is significant at 95% confidence) 
 
Specification: 
 
I II III 
 
N 
 
 
142 
 
142 
 
142 
F 
 
27.77 18.14 51.89 
R2 
 
0.505 0.553 0.798 
Latitude degrees 
from equator 
 
0.045 
(0.011) 
0.047 
(0.010) 
0.015 
(0.007) 
Landlocked? 
 
-1.059 
(0.198) 
 
-1.005 
(0.196) 
-0.499 
(0.138) 
Average annual 
temperature (˚F) 
 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
Average annual 
rainfall < µ - σ  
 
-0.306 
(0.237) 
-0.285 
(0.231) 
0.081 
(0.158) 
Average annual 
rainfall > µ + σ  
 
0.004 
(0.309) 
-0.016 
(0.304) 
-0.216 
(0.206) 
British legal 
foundations? 
 
 0.770 
(0.277) 
0.757 
(0.187) 
French legal 
foundations? 
 
 0.568 
(0.264) 
0.666 
(0.178) 
German legal 
foundations? 
 
 1.370 
(0.446) 
0.466 
(0.309) 
Scandic legal 
foundations? 
 
 0.144 
(0.465) 
-0.076 
(0.313) 
Gender 
Inequality Index 
 
  -5.592 
(0.443) 
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Table 2: Countries with the biggest residuals from regressions of log gross 
domestic product per capita at purchasing power parity 
 
Specification: 
 
I II III 
 
Positive residuals 
(biggest first) 
 
 
 
Singapore 
Qatar 
Brunei D. 
Macao 
Luxembourg 
Seychelles 
U.A.E. 
 
 
Singapore 
Qatar 
Macao 
Seychelles 
Brunei D. 
Eq. Guinea 
Luxembourg 
 
Qatar 
Botswana 
Panama 
Saudi Arabia 
Luxembourg 
United States 
Hungary 
Negative 
residuals 
(biggest last) 
 
Burundi 
Tanzania 
Benin 
Uzbekistan 
Estonia 
Papua N.G. 
Albania 
 
Cameroon 
Germany 
Mongolia 
Benin 
Russia 
Moldova 
Burundi 
Haiti 
Mauritania 
Liberia 
Mozambique 
Iraq 
D.R. Congo 
Burundi 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The question of causality is somewhat simplified when dealing with deep 
factors that may affect living standards. Though some countries’ borders have 
been determined relatively recently, in general geography is not a result of 
changes in living standards. By the same token, if the colonizing powers of 
previous centuries were all seeking economic benefits, then there is no reason 
to suppose that future changes in living standards differentially affected 
their choice of which lands to invade. 
 
Causality is a somewhat more nettlesome question for gender inequality. I 
use it as an explanatory variable because it may be related to longstanding 
aspects of countries’ cultures. Of course, gender inequality has changed 
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greatly within many countries in just the past few decades, and some of those 
changes may have been related to growth in living standards. But big 
differences in gender inequality persist among countries at all levels of living 
standards, and the biggest differences at each level – say, between Qatar (GII 
= 0.549) and the Norway (GII = 0.075), or Rwanda (GII = 0.453) and 
Afghanistan (GII = 0.707) – are undoubtedly related to cultural norms that 
date back centuries. 
 
In any event, determining causality among the independent variables is not 
the main point of this research. The central question here is how, having 
controlled for the effects of these variables, to explain the residuals from the 
regressions. 
 
In the third regression, with the full complement of independent variables, 
only 20 percent of the variation in log living standards is left in the residuals.  
The countries with the biggest positive residuals are (in order) Qatar, 
Botswana, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Luxembourg, United States, and Hungary.  
 
Finding hints for these residuals is relatively straightforward, starting with 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia, two of the world’s biggest exporters of natural gas 
and oil, respectively. The regression equation predicts per capita purchasing 
power of about $4,200 for Qatar after subtracting natural resource rents, 
when the value for 2010 is actually $55,800. Part of the difference stems from 
an underestimate of the importance of natural resource rents in Qatar’s gross 
domestic product. Though the World Bank estimates the share of rents at 28 
percent, others put the share almost twice as high. Changing the value of the 
variable to 52 percent, a recent estimate from Qatar National Bank Capital 
(Qatar News Agency, 2011), leads to a much smaller, but still significant 
residual of about $33,000. Qatar may still be an overachiever, but not by as 
much as the residual would suggest. Saudi Arabia’s petroleum sector may 
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also raise its living standards in ways not captured by the World Bank’s data, 
though the bank’s estimate of the sector’s contribution to gross domestic 
product is similar to official statistics [Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, 2012]. 
 
Botswana and Panama are simpler cases. Botswana receives enormous rents 
from diamonds, which are not included in the World Bank’s measure (only 
tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and phosphate are 
included). In fact, the World Bank’s own report on Botswana suggests mining 
accounted for about 28 percent of gross domestic product in 2009, though the 
rents figure in its database is only 4 percent [Lewin, 2011]. Adjusting the 
data in the third regression reduces Botswana’s residual to $6,800 from 
$10,200. 
 
Similarly, Panama also garners rents from a quirk of geographical and 
colonialist fate – its location and selection for the transoceanic canal. 
Revenues from the canal contribute about 8 percent of gross domestic product 
directly [Xinhua, 2012], but the presence of the canal may have contributed 
in many other ways to Panama’s development. Finally, Luxembourg’s high 
residual likely results, at least in part, from a different kind of rent – its 
position as a financial paradise. 
 
The two countries with the next-biggest residuals are the United States and 
Hungary. For the United States, the predicted per capita purchasing power is 
$18,000 versus the actual value of $46,100. It is possible that the importance 
of natural resource wealth has also been underestimated here. Moreover, 
natural resources were once a much more important part of the American 
economy, and so their contribution to living standards today may be 
underrated by the current measure of non-oil per capita purchasing power. 
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But even a century ago, the United States was a far more diversified economy 
than any of those discussed above. It seems likely that the residual here, 
more than in the other cases, represents what the people of the United States 
have been able to add to their living standards through their own ingenuity 
and the openness of their economy. To be sure, this interpretation of the 
residual is a sum total of progress over time, rather than a measure of the 
American economy’s current capacity for innovation. But it suggests that the 
United States has indeed pushed much further than one might have expected 
given its starting point. 
 
It is worth noting that the residual for the United States would disappear 
completely if its 0.237 value for the GII – which is higher than for any other 
country with non-oil per capita purchasing power above $30,000 except for 
the Bahamas and Qatar – were changed to Austria’s value of 0.136. To the 
extent that the GII is a subjective measure, the residual may be subjective as 
well. Yet one might revise the statement above to say that the United States 
has achieved much more than expected given its cultural forces diminishing 
the equality of women. 
 
Hungary also scores poorly on the GII, at least relative to its fellow former 
socialist members of the European Union. It overachieves with non-oil 
purchasing power per capita of $20,600 versus a predicted $8,800. Replacing 
its GII of 0.237 with the Czech Republic’s value of 0.136 would reduce the gap 
to $5,200. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Czech and Slovak Republics – also 
landlocked, also formerly socialist – have fairly large residuals as well. What 
allowed these countries, and most of all Hungary, to overachieve? Perhaps 
Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia maintained more of an independent 
spirit during the state-socialist years; after all, both revolted against Soviet 
power. Arguably, they also had cultural traditions more reminiscent of those 
in Western Europe. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, the seven countries with the biggest 
negative residuals are not exactly a mysterious bunch, either. The five at the 
absolute bottom all suffered from years of destructive civil conflict in the 
recent past: Burundi (1993-2005), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (on 
and off since 1996), Iraq (2003 to the present), Mozambique (1977-1992), and 
Liberia (two long wars between 1989 and 2003). Another one of the seven, 
Haiti, had a particularly cruel and extractive dictatorship for three decades, 
then bouts of political instability that continued until it lost roughly 5 percent 
of gross domestic product in the earthquake of 2010. The last one, 
Mauritania, has been called “slavery’s last stronghold” [Sutter, 2012]; as 
much as 20 percent of the population may still be enslaved, despite its official 
abolition in 1981 [U.S. State Department, 2011]. Two decades of dictatorship 
that included a massive nationalization of privately held land, followed by 
two coups, have also retarded economic progress. 
 
Because civil conflict can be a product of longstanding cultural and political 
forces, such as ethnic differences and borders drawn by foreign powers, it 
may qualify as a proxy for deep factors as well. Yet civil wars are difficult to 
quantify with just one variable. For example, looking at the years of conflict 
within a given period, say the past five decades, would miss any differences 
in intensity; Colombia has arguably been in a continual state of war since the 
1960s, but its war has been far less devastating than many of the civil 
conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, or the current conflict in Syria. In any event, 
a composite variable might explain more of the variation, especially among 
the underachievers. 
 
This discussion of residuals has been heuristic and imprecise, to be sure, but 
so are the relationships between deep factors and living standards. Countless 
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other factors affect living standards, and it would be unreasonable to expect a 
regression – or any other method – to explain 100 percent of the variation. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Every country is a special case in terms of economic development. Still, some 
factors determined long ago – geographic, institutional, cultural – are 
powerful enough to affect the fortunes of people around the world in similar 
ways. A small assortment of these factors can account for 80 percent of the 
variation in living standards between countries today. 
 
A large part of the other 20 percent may also be somewhat predetermined, 
whether by a treasure trove of diamonds, borders badly drawn, or a handy 
location for international shipping. As a result, perhaps just 10 percent of 
what economically separates a Norwegian from a Nigerien may result from 
the sum total of human innovation in technology, policy, and the other 
products of an organized society. As economists we must direct our focus to 
this 10 percent and pay special attention to the success of the overachievers. 
Yet we should not assume that bridging the other 90 percent of the gap might 
ever be easy. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Regression of log per capita gross domestic product at purchasing 
power parity, full sample (boldface signifies coefficient is significant at 95% 
confidence) 
 
Specification: 
 
I II 
 
N 
 
 
177 
 
177 
F 
 
25.37 16.98 
R2 
 
0.426 0.478 
Latitude degrees 
from equator 
 
0.038 
(0.010) 
0.040 
(0.010) 
Landlocked? 
 
-1.080 
(0.202) 
 
-1.020 
(0.199) 
Average annual 
temperature (˚F) 
 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.021 
(0.013) 
Average annual 
rainfall < µ - σ  
 
-0.374 
(0.224) 
-0.313 
(0.220) 
Average annual 
rainfall > µ + σ  
 
0.171 
(0.238) 
-0.137 
(0.233) 
British legal 
foundations? 
 
 0.878 
(0.276) 
French legal 
foundations? 
 
 0.546 
(0.263) 
German legal 
foundations? 
 
 1.393 
(0.467) 
Scandic legal 
foundations? 
 0.201 
(1.027) 
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Table A2: Countries with the biggest residuals from regressions of log gross 
domestic product per capita at purchasing power parity, full sample 
 
Specification: 
 
I II 
 
Positive residuals 
(biggest first) 
 
 
 
Singapore 
Qatar 
Luxembourg 
Macao 
U.A.E. 
Brunei D. 
Seychelles 
 
 
Singapore 
Qatar 
Macao 
Seychelles 
Luxembourg 
Brunei D. 
U.A.E. 
Negative 
residuals 
(biggest last) 
 
Guinea 
Madagascar 
Eritrea 
Iraq 
Mozambique 
Sao Tome and P. 
Liberia 
 
Bangladesh 
Eritrea 
Mozambique 
Sierra Leone 
Iraq 
Sao Tome and P. 
Liberia 
 
